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Abstract
“What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of ques-
tioning.” – Werner Heisenberg
Progress in machine learning is measured by careful evaluation on problems of
outstanding common interest. However, the proliferation of benchmark suites
and environments, adversarial attacks, and other complications has diluted the
basic evaluation model by overwhelming researchers with choices. Deliberate
or accidental cherry picking is increasingly likely, and designing well-balanced
evaluation suites requires increasing effort. In this paper we take a step back
and propose Nash averaging. The approach builds on a detailed analysis of the
algebraic structure of evaluation in two basic scenarios: agent-vs-agent and agent-
vs-task. The key strength of Nash averaging is that it automatically adapts to
redundancies in evaluation data, so that results are not biased by the incorporation
of easy tasks or weak agents. Nash averaging thus encourages maximally inclusive
evaluation – since there is no harm (computational cost aside) from including all
available tasks and agents.
1 Introduction
Evaluation is a key driver of progress in machine learning, with e.g. ImageNet [1] and the Arcade
Learning Environment [2] enabling subsequent breakthroughs in supervised and reinforcement
learning [3, 4]. However, developing evaluations has received little systematic attention compared to
developing algorithms. Immense amounts of compute is continually expended smashing algorithms
and tasks together – but the results are almost never used to evaluate and optimize evaluations. In a
striking asymmetry, results are almost exclusively applied to evaluate and optimize algorithms.
The classic train-and-test paradigm on common datasets, which has served the community well [5], is
reaching its limits. Three examples suffice. Adversarial attacks have complicated evaluation, raising
questions about which attacks to test against [6–9]. Training agents far beyond human performance
with self-play means they can only really be evaluated against each other [10, 11]. The desire to build
increasingly general-purpose agents has led to a proliferation of environments: Mujoco, DM Lab,
Open AI Gym, Psychlab and others [12–15].
In this paper we pause to ask, and partially answer, some basic questions about evaluation: Q1. Do
tasks test what we think they test? Q2. When is a task redundant? Q3. Which tasks (and agents)
matter the most? Q4. How should evaluations be evaluated?
We consider two scenarios: agent vs task (AvT), where algorithms are evaluated on suites of datasets
or environments; and agent vs agent (AvA), where agents compete directly as in Go and Starcraft.
Our goal is to treat tasks and agents symmetrically – with a view towards, ultimately, co-optimizing
agents and evaluations. From this perspective AvA, where the task is (beating) another agent, is
especially interesting. Performance in AvA is often quantified using Elo ratings [16] or the closely
related TrueSkill [17]. There are two main problems with Elo. Firstly, Elo bakes-in the assumption
that relative skill is transitive; but Elo is meaningless – it has no predictive power – in cyclic games
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like rock-paper-scissors. Intransitivity has been linked to biodiversity in ecology, and may be useful
when evolving populations of agents [18–21]. Secondly, an agent’s Elo rating can be inflated by
instantiating many copies of an agent it beats (or conversely). This can cause problems when Elo
guides hyper-optimization methods like population-based training [22]. Similarly, the most important
decision when constructing a task-suite is which tasks to include. It is easy, and all too common, to
bias task-suites in favor of particular agents or algorithms.
1.1 Overview
Section 2 presents background information on Elo and tools for working with antisymmetric matrices,
such as the Schur decomposition and combinatorial Hodge theory. A major theme underlying the
paper is that the fundamental algebraic structure of tournaments and evaluation is antisymmetric [23].
Techniques specific to antisymmetric matrices are less familiar to the machine learning community
than approaches like PCA that apply to symmetric matrices and are typically correlation-based.
Section 3 presents a unified approach to representing evaluation data, where agents and tasks are
treated symmetrically. A basic application of the approach results in our first contribution: a
multidimensional Elo rating (mElo) that handles cyclic interactions. We also sketch how the Schur
decomposition can uncover latent skills and tasks, providing a partial answer to Q1. We illustrate
mElo on the domain of training an AlphaGo agent [24].
The second contribution of the paper is Nash averaging, an evaluation method that is invariant
to redundant tasks and agents, see section 4. The basic idea is to play a meta-game on evaluation
data [25]. The meta-game has a unique maximum entropy Nash equilibrium. The key insight of the
paper is that the maxent Nash adapts automatically to the presence of redundant tasks and agents. The
maxent Nash distribution thus provides a principled answer to Q2 and Q3: which tasks and agents do
and do not matter is determined by a meta-game. Finally, expected difficulty of tasks under the Nash
distribution on agents yields a partial answer to Q4. The paper concludes by taking a second look at
the performance of agents on Atari. We find that, under Nash averaging, human performance ties
with the best agents, suggesting better-than-human performance has not yet been achieved.
1.2 Related work
Legg and Hutter developed a definition of intelligence which, informally, states “intelligence measures
an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments” [26, 27]. Formally, they consider
all computable tasks weighted by algorithmic complexity [28–30]. Besides being incomputable, the
distribution places (perhaps overly) heavy weight on the simplest tasks.
A comprehensive study of performance metrics for machine learning and AI can be found in [31–35].
There is a long history of psychometric evaluation in humans, some of which has been applied
in artificial intelligence [36–38]. Bradley-Terry models provide a general framework for pairwise
comparison [39]. Researchers have recently taken a second look at the arcade learning environment [2]
and introduced new performance metrics [40]. However, the approach is quite particular. Recent
work using agents to evaluate games has somewhat overlapping motivation with this paper [41–45].
Item response theory is an alternative, and likely complementary, approach to using agents to evaluate
tasks [46] that has recently been applied to study the performance of agents on the Arcade Learning
Environment [47].
Our approach draws heavily on work applying combinatorial Hodge theory to statistical ranking [48]
and game theory [49–51]. We also draw on empirical game theory [52, 53], by using a meta-game to
“evaluate evaluations”, see section 4. Empirical game theory has been applied to domains like poker
and continuous double auctions, and has recently been extended to asymmetric games [54–58]. von
Neumann winners in the dueling bandit setting and NE-regret are related to Nash averaging [59–62].
2 Preliminaries
Notation. Vectors are column vectors. 0 and 1 denote the constant vectors of zeros and ones
respectively. We sometimes use subscripts to indicate dimensions of vectors and matrices, e.g. rn×1
or Sm×n and sometimes their entries, e.g. ri or Sij ; no confusion should result. The unit vector with
a 1 in coordinate i is ei. Proofs and code are in the appendix.
2
2.1 The Elo rating system
Suppose n agents play a series of pairwise matches against each other. Elo assigns a rating ri to each
player i ∈ [n] based on their wins and losses, which we represent as an n-vector r. The predicted
probability of i beating j given their Elo ratings is
pˆij :=
10ri/400
10ri/400 + 10rj/400
= σ(αri − αrj), where σ(x) = 1
1 + e−x
and α =
log(10)
400
.
The constant α is not important in what follows, so we pretend α = 1. Observe that only the
difference between Elo ratings affects win-loss predictions. We therefore impose that Elo ratings sum
to zero, rᵀ1 = 0, without loss of generality. Define the loss,
`Elo(pij , pˆij) = −pij log pˆij − (1− pij) log(1− pˆij), where pˆij = σ(ri − rj)
and pij is the true probability of i beating j. Suppose the tth match pits player i against j, with
outcome Stij = 1 if i wins and S
t
ij = 0 if i loses. Online gradient descent on `Elo obtains
rt+1i ← rti − η · ∇ri`Elo(Stij , pˆtij) = rti + η · (Stij − pˆtij).
Choosing learning rate η = 16 or 32 recovers the updates introduced by Arpad Elo in [16].
The win-loss probabilities predicted by Elo ratings can fail in simple cases. For example, rock, paper
and scissors will all receive the same Elo ratings. Elo’s predictions are pˆij = 12 for all i, j – and so
Elo has no predictive power for any given pair of players (e.g. paper beats rock with p = 1).
What are the Elo update’s fixed points? Suppose we batch matches to obtain empirical estimates
of the probability of player i beating j: p¯ij =
∑
n
Snij
Nij
. As the number of matches approaches infinity,
the empirical estimates approach the true probabilities pij .
Proposition 1. Elo ratings are at a stationary point under batch updates iff the matrices of empirical
probabilities and predicted probabilities have the same row-sums (or, equivalently the same column-
sums):
∇ri
∑
j
`Elo(p¯ij , pˆij)
 = 0 ∀i iff ∑
j
p¯ij =
∑
j
pˆij ∀i.
Many different win-loss probability matrices result in identical Elo ratings. The situation is analogous
to how many different joint probability distributions can have the same marginals. We return to this
topic in section 3.1.
2.2 Antisymmetric matrices
We recall some basic facts about antisymmetric matrices. Matrix A is antisymmetric if A + Aᵀ = 0.
Antisymmetric matrices have even rank and imaginary eigenvalues {±iλj}rank(A)/2j=1 . Any antisym-
metric matrix A admits a real Schur decomposition:
An×n = Qn×n ·Λn×n ·Qᵀn×n,
where Q is orthogonal and Λ consists of zeros except for (2× 2) diagonal-blocks of the form:
Λ =
(
0 λj
−λj 0
)
.
The entries of Λ are real numbers, found by multiplying the eigenvalues of A by i =
√−1.
Proposition 2. Given matrix Sm×n with rank r and singular value decomposition Um×rDr×rVᵀr×n.
Construct antisymmetric matrix
A(m+n)×(m+n) =
(
0m×m Sm×n
−Sᵀn×m 0n×n
)
.
Then the thin Schur decomposition of A is Q(m+n)×2rΛ2r×2rQ
ᵀ
2r×(m+n) where the nonzero pairs
in Λ2r×2r are ± the singular values in Dr×r and
Q(m+n)×2r =
(−u1 0m×1 · · · −ur 0m×1
0n×1 v1 · · · 0n×1 vr
)
.
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Combinatorial Hodge theory is developed by analogy with differential geometry, see [48–51].
Consider a fully connected graph with vertex set [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Assign a flow Aij ∈ R to each
edge of the graph. The flow in the opposite direction ji is Aji = −Aij , so flows are just (n × n)
antisymmetric matrices. The flow on a graph is analogous to a vector field on a manifold.
The combinatorial gradient of an n-vector r is the flow: grad(r) := r1ᵀ−1rᵀ. Flow A is a gradient
flow if A = grad(r) for some r, or equivalently if Aij = ri − rj for all i, j. The divergence of a
flow is the n-vector div(A) := 1nA · 1. The divergence measures the contribution to the flow of each
vertex, considered as a source. The curl of a flow is the three-tensor curl(A)ijk = Aij + Ajk−Aik.
Finally, the rotation is rot(A)ij = 1n
∑n
k=1 curl(A)ijk.
Theorem (Hodge decomposition, [48]). (i) div ◦ grad(r) = r for any r satisfying rᵀ1 = 0.
(ii) div ◦ rot(A) = 0n×1 for any flow A. (iii) rot ◦ grad(r) = 0n×n for any vector r.
(iv) The vector space of antisymmetric matrices admits an orthogonal decomposition{
flows
}
=
{
antisymmetric matrices
}
= im(grad)⊕ im(rot)
with respect to the standard inner product 〈A,B〉 = ∑ij AijBij . Concretely, any antisymmetric
matrix decomposes as
A =
{
transitive component
}
+
{
cyclic component
}
= grad(r)+rot(A) where r = div(A).
Sneak peak. The divergence recovers Elo ratings or just plain average performance depending on
the scenario. The Hodge decomposition separates transitive (captured by averages or Elo) from
cyclic interactions (rock-paper-scissors), and explains when Elo ratings make sense. The Schur
decomposition is a window into the latent skills and tasks not accounted for by Elo and averages.
3 On the algebraic structure of evaluation
The Schur decomposition and combinatorial Hodge theory provide a unified framework for analyzing
evaluation data in the AvA and AvT scenarios. In this section we provide some basic tools and present
a multidimensional extension of Elo that handles cyclic interactions.
3.1 Agents vs agents (AvA)
In AvA, results are collated into a matrix of win-loss probabilities based on relative frequencies.
Construct A = logit P with Aij := log
pij
1−pij . Matrix A is antisymmetric since pij + pji = 1.
When can Elo correctly predict win-loss probabilities? The answer is simple in logit space:
Proposition 3. (i) If probabilities P are generated by Elo ratings r then the divergence of its logit is
r. That is,
if pij = σ(ri − rj) ∀i, j then div(logit P) =
( 1
n
n∑
j=1
(ri − rj)
)n
i=1
= r.
(ii) There is an Elo rating that generates probabilities P iff curl(logit P) = 0. Equivalently, iff
log
pij
pji
+ log
pjk
pkj
+ log pkipik = 0 for all i, j, k.
Elo is, essentially, a uniform average in logit space. Elo’s predictive failures are due to the cyclic
component A˜ := rot(logit P) that uniform averaging ignores.
Multidimensional Elo (mElo2k). Elo ratings bake-in the assumption that relative skill is transitive.
However, there is no single dominant strategy in games like rock-paper-scissors or (arguably)
StarCraft. Rating systems that can handle intransitive abilities are therefore necessary. An obvious
approach is to learn a feature vector w and a rating vector ri per player, and predict pˆij = σ(r
ᵀ
i w −
rᵀjw). Unfortunately, this reduces to the standard Elo rating since r
ᵀ
i w is a scalar.
Handling intransitive abilities requires learning an approximation to the cyclic component A˜. Com-
bining the Schur and Hodge decompositions allows to construct low-rank approximations that extend
Elo. Note, antisymmetric matrices have even rank. Consider
An×n = grad(r) + A˜ ≈ grad(r) + Cᵀ
 0 1−1 0
. . .
C =: grad(r) + Cᵀn×2kΩ2k×2kC2k×n
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where the rows of C are orthogonal to each other, to r, and to 1. The larger 2k, the better the
approximation. Let mElo2k assign each player Elo rating ri and 2k-dimensional vector ci. Vanilla
Elo uses 2k = 0. The mElo2k win-loss prediction is
mElo2k: pˆij = σ
(
ri − rj + cᵀi ·Ω2k×2k · cj
)
where Ω2k×2k =
k∑
i=1
(e2i−1e
ᵀ
2i − e2ieᵀ2i−1).
Online updates can be computed by gradient descent, see section E, with orthogonality enforced.
3.2 Application: predicting win-loss probabilities in Go
Elo ratings are widely used in Chess and Go. We compared the predictive capabilities of Elo and the
simplest extension mElo2 on eight Go algorithms taken from extended data table 9 in [24]: seven
variants of AlphaGo, and Zen. The Frobenius norms and logistic losses are ‖P− Pˆ‖F = 0.85 and
`log = 1.41 for Elo vs the empirical probabilities and ‖P− Pˆ2‖F = 0.35 and `log = 1.27 for mElo2.
To better understand the difference, we zoom in on three algorithms that were observed to interact
non-transitively in [58]: αv with value net, αp with policy net, and Zen. Elo’s win-loss predictions
are poor (Table Elo: Elo incorrectly predicts both that αp likely beats αv and αv likely beats Zen),
whereas mElo2 (Table mElo2) correctly predicts likely winners in all cases (Table empirical), with
more accurate probabilities:
Elo αv αp Zen
αv - 0.41 0.58
αp 0.59 - 0.67
Zen 0.42 0.33 -
empirical αv αp Zen
αv - 0.7 0.4
αp 0.3 - 1.0
Zen 0.6 0.0 -
mElo2 αv αp Zen
αv - 0.72 0.46
αp 0.28 - 0.98
Zen 0.55 0.02 -
3.3 Agents vs tasks (AvT)
In AvT, results are represented as an (m×n) matrix S: rows are agents, columns are tasks, entries are
scores (e.g. accuracy or total reward). Subtract the total mean, so the sum of all entries of S is zero.
We recast both agents and tasks as players and construct an antisymmetric (m+n)× (m+n)-matrix.
Let s = 1mS · 1m×1 and d = − 1nSᵀ · 1n×1 be the average skill of each agent and the average
difficulty of each task. Define S˜ = S− (s · 1ᵀ − 1 ·dᵀ). Let r be the concatenation of s and d. We
construct the antisymmetric matrix
A(m+n)×(m+n) = grad(r) +
(
0m×m S˜m×n
−S˜ᵀn×m 0n×n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A˜
=
(
grad(s) Sm×n
−Sᵀn×m grad(d)
)
.
The top-right block of A is agent performance on tasks; the bottom-left is task difficulty for agents.
The top-left block compares agents by their average skill on tasks; the bottom-right compares tasks
by their average difficulty for agents. Average skill and difficulty explain the data if the score of
agent i on task j is Sij = si − dj , the agent’s skill minus the task’s difficulty, for all i, j. Paralleling
proposition 3, averages explain the data, S = s1ᵀ − 1dᵀ, iff curl(A) = 0.
The failure of averages to explain performance is encapsulated in S˜ and A˜. By proposition 2, the
SVD of S˜ and Schur decomposition of A˜ are equivalent. If the SVD is S˜m×n = Um×rDr×rV
ᵀ
r×n
then the rows of U represent the latent abilities exhibited by agents and the rows of V represent the
latent problems posed by tasks.
4 Invariant evaluation
Evaluation is often based on metrics like average performance or Elo ratings. Unfortunately, two (or
two hundred) tasks or agents that look different may test/exhibit identical skills. Overrepresenting
particular tasks or agents introduces biases into averages and Elo – biases that can only be detected
post hoc. Humans must therefore decide which tasks or agents to retain, to prevent redundant agents
or tasks from skewing results. At present, evaluation is not automatic and does not scale. To be
scalable and automatic, an evaluation method should always benefit from including additional agents
and tasks. Moreover, it should adjust automatically and gracefully to redundant data.
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Definition 1. An evaluation method maps data to a real-valued function on players (that is, agents
or agents and tasks):
E : {evaluation data} = {antisymmetric matrices}→ [{players}→ R].
Desired properties. An evaluation method should be:
P1. Invariant: adding redundant copies of an agent or task to the data should make no difference.
P2. Continuous: the evaluation method should be robust to small changes in the data.
P3. Interpretable: hard to formalize, but the procedure should agree with intuition in basic cases.
Elo and uniform averaging over tasks are examples of evaluation methods that invariance excludes.
4.1 Nash averaging
This section presents an evaluation method satisfying properties P1, P2, P3. We discuss AvA here,
see section D for AvT. Given antisymmetric logit matrix A, define a two-player meta-game with
payoffs µ1(p,q) = pᵀAq and µ2(p,q) = pᵀBq for the row and column meta-players, where
B = Aᵀ. The game is symmetric because B = Aᵀ and zero-sum because B = −A.
The row and column meta-players pick ‘teams’ of agents. Their payoff is the expected log-odds
of their respective team winning under the joint distribution. If there is a dominant agent that has
better than even odds of beating the rest, both players will pick it. In rock-paper-scissors, the only
unbeatable-on-average team is the uniform distribution. In general, the value of the game is zero and
the Nash equilibria are teams that are unbeatable in expectation.
A problem with Nash equilibria (NE) is that they are not unique, which forces the user to make
choices and undermines interpretability [63, 64]. Fortunately, for zero-sum games there is a natural
choice of Nash:
Proposition 4 (maxent NE). For antisymmetric A there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
(p∗,p∗) solving maxp∈∆n minq∈∆n p
ᵀAq with greater entropy than any other Nash equilibrium.
Maxent Nash is maximally indifferent between players with the same empirical performance.
Definition 2. The maxent Nash evaluation method for AvA is
Em :
{
evaluation data
}
=
{
antisymmetric matrices
} maxent NE−−−−−→ [{players} Nash average−−−−−−−→ R] ,
where p∗A is the maxent Nash equilibrium and nA := A · p∗A is the Nash average.
Invariance to redundancy is best understood by looking at an example; for details see section C.
Example 1 (invariance). Consider two logit matrices, where the second adds a redundant copy of
agent C to the first:
A A B C
A 0.0 4.6 -4.6
B -4.6 0.0 4.6
C 4.6 -4.6 0.0
and
A′ A B C1 C2
A 0.0 4.6 -4.6 -4.6
B -4.6 0.0 4.6 4.6
C1 4.6 -4.6 0.0 0.0
C2 4.6 -4.6 0.0 0.0
The maxent Nash for A is p∗A = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). It is easy to check that (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
α
3 ,
1−α
3 ) is Nash for A
′ for
any α ∈ [0, 1] and thus the maxent Nash for A′ is p∗A′ = (13 , 13 , 16 , 16 ). Maxent Nash automatically
detects the redundant agents C1, C2 and distributes C’s mass over them equally.
Uniform averaging is not invariant to adding redundant agents; concretely div(A) = 0 whereas
div(A′) = (−1.15, 1.15, 0, 0), falsely suggesting agent B is superior. In contrast, nA = 03×1 and
nA′ = 04×1 (the zero-vectors have different sizes because there are different numbers of agents).
Nash averaging correctly reports no agent is better than the rest in both cases.
Theorem 1 (main result for AvA2). The maxent NE has the following properties:
2The main result for AvT is analogous, see section D.
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Figure 1: (A) The Nash p∗a assigned to agents; (B) the Nash p
∗
e assigned to environments.
P1. Invariant: Nash averaging, with respect to the maxent NE, is invariant to redundancies in A.
P2. Continuous: If p∗ is a Nash for Aˆ and  = ‖A− Aˆ‖max then p∗ is an -Nash for A.
P3. Interpretable: (i) The maxent NE on A is the uniform distribution, p∗ = 1n1, iff the meta-game
is cyclic, i.e. div(A) = 0. (ii) If the meta-game is transitive, i.e. A = grad(r), then the maxent
NE is the uniform distribution on the player(s) with highest rating(s) – there could be a tie.
See section C for proof and formal definitions. For interpretability, if A = grad(r) then the transitive
rating is all that matters: Nash averaging measures performance against the best player(s). If
div(A) = 0 then no player is better than any other. Mixed cases cannot be described in closed form.
The continuity property is quite weak: theorem 1.2 shows the payoff is continuous: a team that is
unbeatable for Aˆ is -beatable for nearby A. Unfortunately, Nash equilibria themselves can jump
discontinuously when A is modified slightly. Perturbed best response converges to a more stable
approximation to Nash [65, 66] that unfortunately is not invariant.
Example 2 (continuity). Consider the cyclic and transitive logit matrices
C =
(
0 1 −1
−1 0 1
1 −1 0
)
and T =
(
0 1 2
−1 0 1
−2 −1 0
)
.
The maxent Nash equilibria and Nash averages of C + T are
p∗C+T =
{(
1+
3 ,
1−2
3 ,
1+
3
)
if 0 ≤  ≤ 12
(1, 0, 0) if 12 < 
and nC+T =
{
(0, 0, 0) 0 ≤  ≤ 12
(0,−1− , 1− 2) 12 < 
The maxent Nash is the uniform distribution over agents in the cyclic case ( = 0), and is concentrated
on the first player when it dominates the others ( > 12 ). When 0 <  <
1
2 the optimal team has most
mass on the first and last players. Nash jumps discontinuously at  = 12 .
4.2 Application: re-evaluation of agents on the Arcade Learning Environment
To illustrate the method, we re-evaluate the performance of agents on Atari [2]. Data is taken
from results published in [67–70]. Agents include rainbow, dueling networks, prioritized replay,
pop-art, DQN, count-based exploration and baselines like human, random-action and no-action.
The 20 agents evaluated on 54 environments are represented by matrix S20×54. It is necessary to
standardize units across environments with quite different reward structures: for each column we
subtract the min and divide by the max so scores lie in [0, 1].
We introduce a meta-game where row meta-player picks aims to pick the best distribution p∗a on
agents and column meta-player aims to pick the hardest distribution p∗e on environments, see section D
for details. We find a Nash equilibrium using an LP-solver; it should be possible to find the maxent
Nash using the algorithm in [71, 72]. The Nash distributions are shown in figure 1. The supports of
the distributions are the ‘core agents’ and the ‘core environments’ that form unexploitable teams. See
appendix for tables containing all skills and difficulties. panel B.
Figure 2A shows the skill of agents under uniform 1nS·1 and Nash S·p∗e averaging over environments;
panel B shows the difficulty of environments under uniform − 1mSᵀ · 1 and Nash −Sᵀ · p∗a averaging
over agents. There is a tie for top between the agents with non-zero mass – including human. This
follows by the indifference principle for Nash equilibria: strategies with support have equal payoff.
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Figure 2: Comparison of uniform and Nash averages. (A) Skill of agents by uniform 1nS · 1 and
Nash S · p∗e averaging over environments. (B) Difficulty of environments under uniform − 1mSᵀ · 1
and Nash −Sᵀ · p∗a averaging over agents. Agents and environments are sorted by Nash-averages.
Our results suggest that the better-than-human performance observed on the Arcade Learning En-
vironment is because ALE is skewed towards environments that (current) agents do well on, and
contains fewer environments testing skills specific to humans. Solving the meta-game automatically
finds a distribution on environments that evens out the playing field and, simultaneously, identifies
the most important agents and environments.
5 Conclusion
A powerful guiding principle when deciding what to measure is to find quantities that are invariant
to naturally occurring transformations. The determinant is computed over a basis – however, the
determinant is invariant to the choice of basis since det(G−1AG) = det(A) for any invertible
matrix G. Noether’s theorem implies the dynamics of a physical system with symmetries obeys a
conservation law. The speed of light is fundamental because it is invariant to the choice of inertial
reference frame.
One must have symmetries in mind to talk about invariance. What are the naturally occurring
symmetries in machine learning? The question admits many answers depending on the context,
see e.g. [73–79]. In the context of evaluating agents, that are typically built from neural networks,
it is unclear a priori whether two seemingly different agents – based on their parameters or hy-
perparameters – are actually different. Further, it is increasingly common that environments and
tasks are parameterized – or are learning agents in their own right, see self-play [10, 11], adversarial
attacks [6–9], and automated curricula [80]. The overwhelming source of symmetry when evaluating
learning algorithms is therefore redundancy: different agents, networks, algorithms, environments
and tasks that do basically the same job.
Nash evaluation computes a distribution on players (agents, or agents and tasks) that automatically
adjusts to redundant data. It thus provides an invariant approach to measuring agent-agent and
agent-environment interactions. In particular, Nash averaging encourages a maximally inclusive
approach to evaluation: computational cost aside, the method should only benefit from including as
many tasks and agents as possible. Easy tasks or poorly performing agents will not bias the results.
As such Nash averaging is a significant step towards more objective evaluation.
Nash averaging is not always the right tool. Firstly, it is only as good as the data: garbage in,
garbage out. Nash decides which environments are important based on the agents provided to it,
and conversely. As a result, the method is blind to differences between environments that do not
make a difference to agents and vice versa. Nash-based evaluation is likely to be most effective when
applied to a diverse array of agents and environments. Secondly, for good or ill, Nash averaging
removes control from the user. One may have good reason to disagree with the distribution chosen by
Nash. Finally, Nash is a harsh master. It takes an adversarial perspective and may not be the best
approach to, say, constructing automated curricula – although boosting is a related approach that
works well [81, 82]. It is an open question whether alternate invariant evaluations can be constructed,
game-theoretically or otherwise.
Acknowledgements. We thank Georg Ostrovski, Pedro Ortega, José Hernández-Orallo and Hado
van Hasselt for useful feedback.
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APPENDIX
A Invariance: Further motivation
Consider agents A, B, C evaluated on a benchmark suite comprising three tasks:
task 1 task 2 task 3 average rank
agent A 89 93 76 86 1st
agent B 85 85 85 85 2nd
agent C 79 74 99 84 3rd
On average, agent A performs best and agent C performs worst. Consider a second benchmark
suite containing an additional fourth task. On the second benchmark suite, agent A performs worst
and agent C performs best on average. However, a closer look at the second suite reveals that the
additional task is a minor variant of one of the original three tasks.
task 1 task 2 task 3a task 3b average rank
agent A 89 93 76 77 84 3rd
agent B 85 85 85 84 85 2nd
agent C 79 74 99 98 88 1st
Measuring performance by uniformly averaging over tasks in a benchmark suite is sensitive to the set
of tasks that are included in the suite. Including redundant tasks, whether consciously or not, can
easily skew average performance in favor of or against particular agents.
The problem becomes more serious when agent performance is measured against other agents, as in
games such as Go, Chess or StarCraft. It is easy to manipulate the measured performance of agents by
tweaking the composition of the population used to evaluate them. Consider the following example:
agent A agent B agent C Elo
agent A 0.5 0.9 0.1 0
agent B 0.1 0.5 0.9 0
agent C 0.9 0.1 0.5 0
The three agents exhibit rock-paper-scissors dynamics; their Elo ratings (normalized to sum to zero)
are all zero. However, adding a second copy of agent C decreases the Elo rating of agent A and
increases the Elo rating of agent B:
agent A agent B agent C1 agent C2 Elo
agent A 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.1 -63
agent B 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.9 63
agent C1 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.5 0
agent C2 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.5 0
That is, the Elo ratings of agents A and B are easily manipulated by changing the structure of the
population.
The examples above suggest it is important to find evaluation metrics that are invariant to redundant
changes in the population of agents or suite of tasks.
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Related work. A different notion of measurement invariance has been proposed in the psychometric
and consumer research literatures [83]. There, measurement invariance refers to the statistical property
that a measurement measures the same construct across a predefined set of groups. For example,
whether or not a question in an IQ test is measurement invariant has to do with whether or not the
question is interpreted in the same way by individuals with different cultural backgrounds.
B Proofs of propositions
Proof of proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Batch Elo updates are stable if the matrices of empirical probabilities and predicted
probabilities have the same row-sums (or, equivalently the same column-sums):
∇i
∑
j
`Elo(p¯ij , pˆij) = 0 ∀i iff
∑
j
p¯ij =
∑
j
pˆij ∀i.
Proof. Player i’s weights are updated in one batch after observing win-loss probabilities p¯ij for each
player j = 1, . . . , n. Observe that
∇i
 n∑
j=1
`Elo(p¯ij , pˆij)
 = n∑
j=1
(p¯ij − pˆij).
The result follows.
Proof of proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Given matrix Sm×n with rank r and singular value decomposition UDVᵀ. Construct
antisymmetric matrix
A(m+n)×(m+n) =
(
0m×m Sm×n
−Sᵀn×m 0n×n
)
.
Then the thin Schur decomposition of A is QΛQᵀ where the eigenpairs in the Λ2r×2r are ± the
singular values in D and
Q(m+n)×r =
(−u1 0m×1 · · · −ur 0m×1
0n×1 v1 · · · 0n×1 vr
)
Proof. Direct computation; multiply out the matrices.
Proof of proposition 3.
Proposition 3. (i) If probabilities P are generated by Elo ratings r then the divergence of its logit is
r. That is,
if pij = σ(ri − rj) ∀i, j then div(logit P) =
( 1
n
n∑
j=1
(ri − rj)
)n
i=1
= r.
(ii) There is an Elo rating that generates probabilities P iff curl(logit P) = 0. Alternatively, iff
log
pij
pji
+ log
pjk
pkj
+ log pkipik = 0 for all i, j, k.
Proof. For the first claim, apply definitions and recall rᵀ1 = 0. For the second, apply the Hodge
decomposition from section 2.2.
Proof of proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (maxent NE). The game maxp∈∆n minq∈∆n pᵀAq, where A is antisymmetric, has a
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (p∗,p∗), with greater entropy than any other Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The Nash equilibria in a two-player zero-sum are rectangular: if (p,q) and (u,v) are Nash
equilibria then so are (p,v) and (u,q). Further, they form a convex polytope. Since Aᵀ = −A,
the set of Nash equilibria is also symmetric: if (p,q) is a Nash equilibrium then so is (q,p). The
entropy H(p) := −∑ni=1 pi log pi is strictly concave and therefore achieves a unique maximum on
the compact, convex, symmetric set of Nash equilibria.
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C Proof of theorem 1
Theorem (main result for AvA). The maxent NE has the following properties:
P1. Invariant: Nash averaging, with respect to the maxent NE, is invariant to redundancies in A.
P2. Continuous: If p∗ is a Nash for Aˆ and  = ‖A− Aˆ‖max then p∗ is an -Nash for A.
P3. Interpretable: (i) The maxent NE on A is the uniform distribution, p∗ = 1n1, iff the meta-game
is cyclic, i.e. div(A) = 0. (ii) If the meta-game is transitive, i.e. A = grad(r), then the maxent
NE is the uniform distribution on the player(s) with highest rating(s) – there could be a tie.
C.1 Proof of theorem 1.1
First, we more precisely formalize invariance to redundancy.
Definition 3 (invariance to copying the last row and column). Given antisymmetric matrix An×n,
denote the right-most column by an. Assume the right-most column (and bottom row) of A differs
from all other columns. Construct antisymmetric matrix
A′(n+1)×(n+1) =
(
A an
−aᵀn 0
)
(1)
by adding an additional copy of the right-most column (and bottom row) to A. A family of functions{
pk : {antisymmetric k × k matrices} → Rk
}∞
k=1
is invariant to adding a row and column according to (1) if
pn+1(A
′)ᵀ =
(
pn(A)[1], . . . ,pn(A)[n− 1], pn(A)[n]
2
,
pn(A)[n]
2
)
.
If the copied row is not unique and receives positive mass under maxent Nash, then maxent Nash will
already be spreading mass across the copies. In that case, adding yet another copy will result in the
maxent Nash on the larger mass spreading mass evenly across all copies.
Lemma 1. Suppose An×n is antisymmetric with Nash equilibrium p. Construct A′ from A by
adding a redundant copy of the right-most column and bottom row according (1). Then
p′α =
(
p1, . . . , pn−1, α · pn, (1− α) · pn
)
is a Nash equilibrium for A′ for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Conversely, if p′ is a Nash equilibrium for A′ then
(p′1, . . . , p
′
n−1, p
′
n + p
′
n+1)
is a Nash equilibrium for A.
Proof. Since the value of the game on A is zero, it follows that p is a Nash equilibrium iff all the
coordinates of Ap are nonnegative, i.e. Ap  0n×1. Direct computation shows that A′p′α 
0(n+1)×1, which implies p′α is a Nash equilibrium for A
′. The converse follows similarly.
Finally, we prove theorem 1.2.
Proof. The definition and lemma are stated in the particular case where the last column and row
are copied. This is simply for notational convenience. They generalize trivially to copying arbitrary
row/columns into arbitrary positions, and can be applied inductively to the cases where A′ is
constructed from A by inserting multiple redundant copies.
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C.2 Proof of theorem 1.2
Recall the max-norm on matrices is ‖S‖max := maxij |Sij |.
Definition 4 (-Nash equilibrium). A joint strategy (p∗,q∗) is an -Nash equilibrium for A if the
benefit from either player deviating, separately, is at most :
max
p′
(p′ − p∗)ᵀAq∗ ≤  and max
q′
(p∗)ᵀA(q∗ − q′) ≤ .
We are now ready to prove
P2 Continuous: If p∗ is a Nash for Aˆ and  = ‖A− Aˆ‖max then p∗ is an -Nash for A.
Proof. Suppose (p∗,p∗) is a Nash equilibrium for the antisymmetric matrix Aˆ. Observe that
(p′ − p∗)ᵀAp∗ = (p′)ᵀAˆp∗ + (p′)ᵀAp∗ − (p′)ᵀAˆp∗
for any distribution p′ because (p∗)ᵀAp∗ = 0 since A is antisymmetric. It follows that
max
p′
{
(p′ − p∗)ᵀAp∗
}
≤ max
p′
{
(p′)ᵀAˆp∗
}
+ max
p′
{
(p′)ᵀ(A− Aˆ)p∗
}
The first term on the right-hand-side is ≤ 0 since p∗ is a Nash equilibrium for Aˆ and the value of the
game is zero. The second term on the right-hand-side is ≤  because ‖A− Aˆ‖max ≤  and p′ and
p∗ are probability distributions.
Note that since ‖S‖max ≤ ‖S‖2 ≤ ‖S‖F for any S, the divergence from Nash is also controlled by
how well Aˆ approximates A in the operator or Frobenius norms.
The proof is adapted from the proof of the following lemma in [58].
Lemma 2 (Nash on approximate games). Suppose (p∗,q∗) is a Nash equilibrium for Aˆ and that
 = ‖A− Aˆ‖max. Then (p∗,q∗) is a 2-Nash for A.
Our result is slightly sharper because we specialize to antisymmetric matrices.
C.3 Proof of theorem 1.3
Proof. (i) If div(A) = 0 then 1n1
ᵀA = 0ᵀ and A 1n1 = 0 implying the uniform distribution is a
Nash equilibrium because there is no incentive to deviate from ( 1n1,
1
n1). The uniform distribution
also has maximum entropy. Conversely, suppose div(A) 6= 0. Then 1ᵀA has at least one positive
and one negative coordinate because we know 1ᵀA1 = 0 by antisymmetry. It follows that if the row
player chooses 1n1
ᵀ then the column player is incentivized to choose a distribution with more mass
on the positive coordinate and less on the negative. In other words, the column player will not play
the uniform distribution, and the uniform distribution is therefore not a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) By assumption A = grad(r) = r1ᵀ−1rᵀ, so pᵀAq = pᵀr−rᵀq decouples into an independent
maximization problem with respect to p and minimization problem with respect to q. It follows
that the optimal distribution p∗ concentrates mass on the maximal coordinate(s) of r and so does q∗.
That is, to be a Nash equilibrium, p∗ and q∗ must place their mass on the maximal coordinate if it is
unique and can distribute it arbitrarily over the set of maximal coordinates if there is a tie. Adding the
condition that the Nash equilibrium has maximum entropy entails placing the uniform distribution
over the maximal coordinate(s).
D Nash averaging for agent-vs-task
Given score matrix Sm×n, construct antisymmetric matrix
A(m+n)×(m+n) =
(
0m×m Sm×n
−Sᵀn×m 0n×n
)
.
Note this differs from the antisymmetrization used in section 3.3, see next remark.
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Remark 1. The graph structure underlying AvT is bipartite: agents interact with tasks and tasks with
agents, but there are no direct agent-agent or task-task interactions. When done in full generality, the
definitions of div, grad and curl take into account the graph structure, see [48]. In particular, div,
grad and curl are computed differently on bipartite graphs than fully connected graphs – note the
definitions in section 2.2 are specific to fully connected graphs. Working in full generality is overkill
for our purposes. It suffices to introduce slightly ad hoc notation to handle the specific case of AvT.
Introduce the notation
diva(S) =
1
m
S · 1m×1 and dive(S) = − 1
n
Sᵀ · 1n×1,
where diva(S) measures uniform average skill of agents on tasks and dive(S) measures uniform
average difficulty of tasks for agents. Let
grad(s,d) = s · 1ᵀ − 1 · dᵀ.
Define a two-player zero-sum meta-game
max
(pa,pe)∈∆m×∆n
min
(qa,qe)∈∆m×∆n
(
pa; pe
)ᵀ
A
(
qa; qe
)
.
The setup is the same as for AvA in the main text except the row and column meta-players each
play two distributions: one on agents and one on tasks/environments. The same argument as in
proposition 4 shows there is a unique symmetric maxent Nash equilibrium
(
(p∗a,p
∗
e), (p
∗
a,p
∗
e)
)
.
Definition 5. The maxent Nash evaluation method for AvT is
Em :
{
evaluation data
}
=
{
antisymmetric matrices
} maxent NEs−−−−−−→ [{players} Nash averages−−−−−−−→ R] ,
where p∗a and p
∗
e are the maxent Nash equilibria over agents and environments and ne := −Sᵀ ·p∗a
and na := S · p∗e are the Nash averages quantifying difficulty of environments (Nash averaged over
agents) and skill of agents (Nash averaged over environments) respectively.
Suppose S decomposes as
S = grad(s,d) + S˜,
where diva(S˜) = 0 and dive(S˜) = 0. Observe that(
pa; pe
)ᵀ
A
(
qa; qe
)
= sᵀ(pa − qa) + dᵀ(pe − qe) + pᵀaS˜qe + qᵀaS˜pe
If S˜ ≡ 0m×n then the game reduces to(
pa; pe
)ᵀ
A
(
qa; qe
)
= sᵀ(pa − qa) + dᵀ(pe − qe)
and so the row player maximizes its payoff by putting all its agent-mass on the most skillful agent(s)
and all of its environment-mass on the most difficult task(s) – and similarly for the column player.
It is easy to check that the maxent Nash (p∗a,p
∗
e) has pa a uniform distribution on all agents iff
diva(S) = 0, and has pe a uniform distribution on tasks iff dive(S) = 0. We thus obtain
Theorem 2 (main result for AvT). The maxent NE has the following properties:
P1. Invariant: Nash averaging is invariant to redundancies in A.
P2. Continuous: If (p∗a,p∗e) is a Nash for Aˆ and 2 = ‖A− Aˆ‖max then (p∗a,p∗e) is an -Nash for
A.
P3. Interpretable: (i) The agent component of the maxent NE on A is the uniform distribution on
agents, p∗a =
1
n1, iff diva(A) = 0.
(ii) The task component of the maxent NE on A is the uniform distribution on tasks, p∗e = 1m1,
iff dive(A) = 0.
(iii) If the meta-game is transitive, i.e. A = grad(s,d), then the maxent NE is the uniform
distribution on the most skillful agent(s) and the uniform distribution on the most difficult task(s)
– there could be ties.
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Figure 3: Visualizing Schur decompositions. (A) Rows of QT4×2 form a straight line, reflecting the
transitive structure of T. (B): Rows of QC4×2 lie on a circle centered at the origin.
E Code for computing mElo2 updates
The routine mElo2_update takes as input: a pair of players i, j, the probability p_ij of player i
beating player j (which could be 0 or 1 if only a single match is observed on the given round), the
rating vector r and the n× 2 matrix c quantifying non-transitive interactions. It returns updates to
the ith and jth entries of r and c.
def mElo2_update(i, j, p_ij, r, c) :
p_hat_ij = sigmoid(r[i]− r[j] + c[i, 0] ∗ c[j, 1]− c[j, 0] ∗ c[i, 1])
delta = p_ij− p_hat_ij
r_update = [ 16 ∗ delta, −16 ∗ delta ]
# r has higher learning rate than c
c_update = [
[ +delta ∗ c[j, 1], −delta ∗ c[i, 1] ],
[−delta ∗ c[j, 0], +delta ∗ c[i, 0] ]
]
return r_update, c_update
F On the geometry of antisymmetric matrices
This section provides some intuition for multidimensional Elo ratings by describing some of the
underling geometry.
F.1 Visualizing the Schur decomposition
Consider the following logit matrices:
T A B C D
A 0 1 2 3
B -1 0 1 2
C -2 -1 0 1
D -3 -2 -1 0
and
C A B C D
A 0 1 0 -1
B -1 0 1 0
C 0 -1 0 1
D 1 0 -1 0
Note that T is transitive since T = grad ◦ div(T) and C is cyclic since div(C) = 0. Both matrices
have rank two, so the thin Schur decomposition can be written
Q4×2Λ2×2Q
ᵀ
2×4
in either case. The matrices QT4×2 and Q
C
4×2 arising from the respective Schur decompositions
QT4×2 =
0.793 0.2670.538 −0.1010.284 −0.469
0.029 −0.836
 and QC4×2 =
−0.296 −0.642−0.642 0.2960.296 0.642
0.642 −0.296

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Figure 4: Visualizing logits. The entry Aij of A is λ times the signed area of the parallelogram cov-
ered by the origin (0, 0), Qi,•, Qi,•+ Qj,• and Qj,•, where Qi,• and Qj,• are vectors corresponding
to row i and row j of Q4×2.
can separately be thought of (and plotted) as four two-vectors, see figure 3. The rows of QT4×2 form a
straight line, see panel A. More generally, if A = grad(r) and r is not identically zero then A is rank
two with thin Schur decomposition A = Qn×2Λ2×2Q
ᵀ
2×n, where the rows of Q are points along a
line. More precisely, the rows are of the form
qk = a + αkb for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
where a,b ∈ R2 and αk ∈ R.
The rows of QC4×2 lie on a circle centered at the origin, see panel B. This does not generalize
to arbitrary cyclic matrices. However, the geometry of antisymmetric matrices has interesting
connections with areas of parallelograms and the complex plane, see next subsection.
F.2 Areas and phases
Observe that
(u1 u2)
(
0 λ
−λ 0
)(
v1
v2
)
= λ · (u1v2 − u2v1), (2)
which is λ times the signed area of the parallelogram covered by (0, 0), u, u + v, and v. It follows
that the Schur decomposition breaks Rn into an orthogonal collection of two-dimensional spaces –
one for each ±λi block – and that the entries Aij of A are sums of signed areas of parallelograms,
one parallelogram per two-dimensional subspace. The case where there is a single two-dimensional
subspace (since the rank of A is two) is illustrated in figure 4.
Alternatively, introduce complex numbers w = u1 + iu2 and z = v1 + iv2, where w = |w| · ei·φw
and z = |z| · ei·φz in polar coordinates. Then, (2) can be rewritten
(u1 u2)
(
0 λ
−λ 0
)
= Im(w · z¯) = |w| · |z| sin(φw − φz).
F.3 Comment on Schur and Hodge
The Schur decomposition is not guaranteed to be compatible with the Hodge decomposition. That is,
grad(A) is not necessarily the span of two rows of the matrix Qn×r arising in the Schur decomposi-
tion. Roughly, this happens when A˜ := A−grad ◦ div(A) is not a good (rankA−2)-approximation
to A in the ‖ · ‖2-norm.
We recommend to first extract the transitive component and then perform the Schur decomposition
on A˜ = rot(A). Although this may not always be optimal with respect to the ‖ · ‖2-norm, it has
the important advantage that div(A) is readily understood by humans as a measure of average
performance.
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Figure 5: Evaluation of environments.
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Figure 6: Evaluation of agents. Note, there are redundancies since agents are taken from multiple
papers; these are ignored by Nash averaging.
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